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CREATURES OF THE COMMON LAW: THE PETTY
OFFENSE DOCTRINE AND 18 U.S.C. § 19
Melissa Hartigan
I. INTRODUCTION: CAN A STATUTE DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?

When Grizzly Bear No. 257 met its 7-mm match in the
Taylors Creek-Lightning Fork drainage outside of Big Sky, Montana,1 only Mr. and Mrs. Paul Normand Clavette were there to
see it. After some persistent investigation by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Clavette admitted killing the bear.2 He knew
that he had committed a crime.3 He also knew that some dollar
value must be attached to it; he offered to compensate the State
of Montana, provided he could have the bear's hide for a rug.4
He later discovered that he could be sentenced to pay a fine up
to $25,000 - and he would not get the rug. Since the maximum
possible prison sentence was only six months, however, he was
denied a jury trial.5
1.
See Trial Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 8-9, United States v. Clavette, No.
MCR-96-001-BU (D. Mont. Jan. 13, 1997), affd, 135 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.), petition for

cert. filed, (U.S. June 22, 1998) (No. 97-9627).
2. See id. at 49.
3. See id. at 61, 178-79.
4. See id. at 62. Clavette was charged under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(aXIXG) and
1540(bX1) (1994) with unlawfully killing a threatened species, a criminal violation of
the Endangered Species Act. The Ninth Circuit called Clavette's offense a violation of
"Interior Department regulations." See Clavette, 135 F.3d at 1310-11. This is clearly
erroneous; 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994), cited by the court, see id. at 1311 & n.21, applies to
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, whereas Clavette's offense
is defined directly by Congress. The court's error probably comes from its reading of
United States v. Nachtigai, 507 U.S. 1 (1993), a case originating in the Ninth Circuit
which involved a true Interior Department regulation against driving under the influence in Yosemite National Park. Unfortunately, this is not the only instance in
which this court and others appear to read the law from previous judicial decisions
rather than from the United States Code. See infra notes 15, 149, 167.
5. See United States v. Clavette, No. MCR-96-001-BU (D. Mont. Apr. 4, 1996)
(order denying jury trial) [hereinafter Order of Apr. 4, 1996]; id., (June 5, 1996)
(second order denying jury trial) [hereinafter Order of June 5, 1996]. Clavette made
a perfunctory motion for a jury trial after District Court Judge Paul Hatfield scheduled the case for bench trial; the Government responded with a thorough brief, and
the motion was denied. See Order of Apr. 4, 1996, at 1. On Clavette's second motion
for jury trial, the Government stipulated that it would not seek a fine in excess of
$10,000. The district court noted the stipulation in its second denial of jury trial. See
Order of June 5, 1996, at 1. Clavette was tried, convicted, and sentenced to pay a
fine of $2,000, to pay $6,250 restitution to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and to conform to certain standard and special conditions of probation for a
period of three years. See United States v. Clavette, No. MCR-96-001-BU (D. Mont.
Jan. 13, 1997), slip op. at 2-3.
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As a matter of constitutional doctrine, a criminal defendant
is not entitled to trial by jury under Article III or the Sixth
Amendment if he is charged with a petty offense.' The United
States Supreme Court has held that an offense punishable by a
prison term of six months or less is presumed to be petty.7 To
date, the Court has not identified any factor sufficient to overcome this presumption.8 However, a fine alone, even where no
prison term is possible, can trigger the jury right Where a fine
is combined with a maximum six-month term of imprisonment,
the Court has yet to decide how high the fine must be to rebut
the increasingly strong presumption against jury trial. °
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas" declares the current
test for the jury right for offenses involving imprisonment of six
months or less to be "whether the additional penalties clearly
reflect a legislative determination of seriousness." 2 In applica6.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. VI; Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540 (1888).
7.
See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
The Court does not allow probationary penalties, even including residence in
8.
a "community correctional facility' for five years, to trigger the jury right under the
Constitution. See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 n.*, 5-6 (1993) (per curam). The Court has also rejected the argument that the penalties for two or more
petty offenses should be combined to determine the defendant's entitlement to jury
trial. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325, 330 (1996). In Lewis, the Court
expressly discussed "aggregate" offenses, though only two were charged. The Court's
manner of dealing with the issue suggests that three or four or ten or a hundred
petty offenses would still not add up to one serious offense capable of triggering the
jury right. The Orwellian whiff of the decision is diffused by the dissenters in the
case - Justices Stevens and Ginsburg - and especially by the concurring opinion of
Justices Kennedy and Breyer. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 330-342.
9. Readers may be relieved to know that the Constitution will guarantee a
jury trial for any offense punishable by a fine of $52 million. See United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (reversing conviction and remanding for jury trial
of a criminal contempt charge).
Several commentators have noticed the shrinking scope of the jury right.
10.
See, e.g., Ann Hopkins, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76 CAL. L. REV.
391 (1988); George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245
(1959); Timothy Lynch, Rethinking the Petty Offense Doctrine, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 7 (Fall 1994); Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Jury
Trial, 97 Wis. L. REv. 133 (1997). These authors have not, however, given the Court
a theoretically coherent way to stop the shrinkage; this Comment attempts to do
that. For insightful analyses of the philosophical and political value of the jury, see
JEFFREY ABRAHAMSON, WE, THE JURY (1994); Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue
and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1556-59 (1993).
11. 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
12. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. All authorities agree the maximum punishment to
which the defendant may be subjected, not the actual punishment imposed, is the
determining factor. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). Contempt cases are categorically
excepted from this rule; there, the punishment ultimately imposed determines the
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tion, this test has focused exclusively on the penalties authorized
by the statute defining the offense in order to discover the "reflection" of the legislature's evaluation of the offense's character.
But what if the legislature evaluates offenses as petty or serious
in some other statute? 18 U.S.C. § 19 defines a petty offense as
one entailing a maximum fine for individuals of $5,000 or
$10,000 for organizations.1 3 The pertinent legislative history
since 1984 clearly reveals Congress' intent that fines over those
levels should trigger the jury right."
Yet the Supreme Court has not discussed the statute since
1975.1' Since Blanton, only the circuit and district courts have
bothered much with Congress' definition, and most courts have
taken the Supreme Court's silence as an indication that the
statute has no application to the jury right, even in cases decided
under federal law.16 The Montana district court stood on this

defendant's right to jury trial. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Because the
Government's stipulation to seek a fine of $10,000 or less still exceeded the $5,000
threshold in 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1994), it will not be discussed here. The only located
published decision to deny jury trial on the basis of a stipulation to seek a fine no
greater than $5,000 is a decision in Bankruptcy Court. See In re Shirley, 184 B.R.
613 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see also infra note 146. At least one circuit holds that jury trial
may be denied to a defendant whom the court declares will not receive a sentence
greater than six months. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.
1991).
13.
Congress' definition of petty offenses has been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 19
since 1987. Congress first created a definition of petty offenses in 1930; it was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) until 1987. See Pub. L. 71-548, 46 Stat. 1029, 1030 (1930);
Pub. L. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987).
14.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-390, at 4-5 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2140-41. See also infra Part LV.B. Congress' definition is most commonly invoked to interpret FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(a), governing the proceedings for misdemeanors and "other petty offenses." See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 15 F.3d 1090
(9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision). The legislative history contemplates a
much broader application.
15. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476-77 (1975). In Blanton, the Court
overlooked Congress' recodification of its definition of petty offenses from 18 U.S.C. §
1(3) to 18 U.S.C. § 19. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545 n.11 (1989), and infra Part
III.B. Since Blanton, the Court has not "cited 18 U.S.C. § 19, but it has cited 18
U.S.C. § 1(3). Apparently, the Court has been reading statutes from cases rather
than from the United States Code. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512
U.S. 821, 837 n.5 (1994). The Ninth Circuit duplicated this error in United States v.
Clavette, 135 F.3d 1308, 1310 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1998).
16. See, e.g., Clavette, 135 F.3d at 1310; United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d
1413 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2517 (1997); United States v. Soderna,
82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hatch v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 507
(1996); Hatch v. Stadtmueller, 41 F.3d 1410 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kozel,
908 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1419 (D.
Kan. 1995).
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ground when it denied Clavette's motion for a jury trial.17 Similarly, defendants charged with violating the Free Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, 8 punishable by up to six months in jail and a
fine up to $10,000, have been denied trial by jury in the circuit
courts. 9 Clavette's case, then, squarely presents two questions
which federal judges have little guidance in answering: where
the maximum prison term is six months, does a $25,000 fine
clearly reflect the legislature's determination that the offense is
serious?" And does 18 U.S.C. § 19 have any bearing on the
measurement of seriousness?2
In addition to these very practical issues, the uncertain
application of 18 U.S.C. § 19 to the petty offense doctrine presents interesting theoretical questions concerning the new
textualism.22 Normally, statutory interpretation can be sharply
distinguished from constitutional interpretation.' In the petty

17.
See Order of Apr. 4, 1996, at 1. See also Order of June 5, 1996, at 1.
18.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1994).
19.
See, e.g., Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1379 (asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 19 does not
determine the constitutional right to jury trial); Unterburger, 97 F.3d at 1415-16
(following Soderna). But see Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1420 & n.1 (holding statutory
definition of petty offenses at 18 U.S.C. § 19 favors granting constitutional right to
jury trial for defendants accused of violating Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act).
20. At oral argument in United States v. Clavette, the Ninth Circuit panel's
questions to both attorneys and the panel's own comments were, inevitably, speculative. The panel noted that a $25,000 fine might deprive a defendant's children of a
college education or cause him to lose his home. The subjectivity of this approach is
the logical result of the courts' disregard of 18 U.S.C. § 19. In Clavette, the Ninth
Circuit was forced to decide whether the United States Supreme Court would consider a $25,000 fine reflective of the legislature's determination of seriousness, not
whether Congress authorized a $25,000 fine because it considered the offense serious.
21. Congress distinguishes between individual and organizational defendants;
$5,000 is the limit for an individual's petty offense, $10,000 for an organization's. For
convenience, the $5,000 figure will be used throughout this comment, except where
clarity or history requires a distinction.
22. The term and its range of meanings are taken from William N. Eskridge,
The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A L. REv. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New
Textualism]. Traditionally, the Supreme Court consults committee reports and other
legislative materials to confirm its interpretation of federal statutes; plain language
prevails unless legislative history contradicts it. See id. at 626. A strict new
textualist will not turn to legislative history unless a statute is patently absurd
when viewed in the context of other statutes, previous judicial interpretations, and
traditional canons of construction. See id. at 655. For a new textualist, plain language controls to an even greater degree than in the traditional approach. The leading figures associated with the new textualism are Justice Scalia of the United
States Supreme Court and Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
23.
Professor Eskridge's article, for example, deals only with statutory interpretation, and constitutional doctrine and statutory interpretation occupy two entirely
different schools of thought, with different scholars leading the field in each category.
Furthermore, as Professor Eskridge points out, the new textualists restrict or alto-
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offense doctrine, constitutional and statutory interpretation intersect. 4 The constitutional doctrine does not require the Court
to invoke a statute, 2 but it does require the Court to gauge the
legislature's determination of seriousness. 18 U.S.C. § 19 does
not refer to the jury right, but it does use a term developed by
the courts - "petty." Moreover, the legislative history is clearly
and exclusively concerned with the jury question. Is there a
point, then, where a statute must be interpreted to give meaning
to a constitutional provision?
Part II of this Comment investigates the historical jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the petty offense doctrine and
explores the role of legislatures in defining which offenses may
be tried without a jury and which require trial by jury. Part III
demonstrates the slow process by which the broad role properly
allocated to the legislature in the constitutional test for the jury
right has been usurped by the judiciary, concluding that contemporary courts overemphasize the term of imprisonment in distinguishing petty from serious cases. Part IV analyzes the statutes
and legislative history accompanying 18 U.S.C. § 19, demonstrating Congress' intent to grant the jury right to defendants subject
to fines over $5,000. Part V proposes a few solutions to the arbitrary and subjective nature of courts' determinations of the jury
right under the current constitutional test.

gether eschew legislative history in statutory interpretation, but they rely heavily on
legislative history - even avowedly propagandistic sources such as The Federalist
Papers - in constitutional interpretation. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note
22, at 682-83.
24. Typically, statutes meet the Constitution when the constitutional validity of
a statute is in question; if the statute is not clearly unconstitutional, a court will
give the statute whatever interpretation is consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). In that sort of case, however, the
meaning of constitutional provisions is not filled in or even influenced by the statute
in question. The petty offense doctrine, by contrast, applies legislative evaluations of
seriousness to determine whether the Constitution entitles a defendant to a jury
trial.
25. Because the petty offense doctrine is judicially created, the judiciary might
be excused for assuming it is none of the legislature's business. A legislature could
not, for example, pass a law mandating bench trial for all drug offenses, because the
Constitution, according to the doctrine, requires jury trial for all serious crimes. See
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Furthermore, it is up to the Court to say what the Constitution requires. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Nonetheless, the petty offense
doctrine itself insists that the legislature ought to have direct, not merely "reflective,"
influence in deciding which offenses must be tried by jury and which may be tried
without one.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
PETTY OFFENSE DOCTRINE

Unique among constitutional doctrines of interpretation, the
petty offense doctrine calls for direct legislative involvement in
the determination of a criminal defendant's constitutional right
to trial by jury. Under the weight of other rules of construction
which are the sole province of the judiciary, courts seem to have
tuned out the call of this doctrine. A look at the birth of the
doctrine and at the legislature's historical authority to define the
scope of the jury right reveals a coherent, workable rule in the
Supreme Court's early cases. Courts should simply toe the line
at which the Constitution limits legislatures' power to deny jury
trial; legislatures' definitions of petty offenses should have direct
bearing on the courts' obligation to grant jury trial under the
Constitution.
A. The Birth of the Petty Offense Doctrine: Callan v. Wilson
(1888)
The plain language of the jury clauses of the Constitution
and the Sixth Amendment is unequivocal and categorical. Article
III of the Constitution states "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in
cases of Impeachment,

shall be by Jury.

... "

The Sixth

Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed...

"27 David Dudley Field, the great

nineteenth-century jurist, derided the suggestion that the Framers did not mean exactly what they said:
The great minds of the country have differed on the correct
interpretation to be given to various provisions of the Federal
Constitution; and judicial decision has often been invoked to
settle their true meaning; but until recently no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was fortified in the organic law
against the power of attack. It is now assailed; but if ideas can
be expressed in words, and language has any meaning, this
right - one of the most valuable in a free country - is preserved to every one accused of crime .... The sixth amendment
affirms that [right in] language broad enough to embrace all
persons and cases ... who [are] subject to indictment or pre-

26.
27.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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sentment [under] the fifth [amendment].2
Despite such oratorical flair, in Field's time and long after,
state legislatures were under no obligation to respect the jury
right; the Constitution constrained only the power of the federal
government. In fact, even under the due process, privileges and
immunities, and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court did not believe that state legislatures were obligated to provide for jury trial at all. In Walker
v. Sauvinet,' the Supreme Court held that a state might abolish jury trial altogether. 0 In Missouri v. Lewis,3 1 the Supreme
Court, albeit in dicta, did not even blink at the proposition that a
state might abolish jury trial in one district while guaranteeing
33 the Court gave
it in another. 2 And in Natal v. Louisiana,
short shrift to Natal's demand for a jury when a municipal ordinance subjected him to a $25 penalty for operating a private
market within six blocks of a public market:
The case is too plain for discussion. By the law of Louisiana, as
in states where the common law prevails, the regulation and
control of markets .. . are matters of municipal police, and may
be intrusted by the legislature to a city council, to be exercised
as in its discretion the public health and convenience may require.3

Until 1968, when Gary Duncan's weightier complaint against

28. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 122-23 (1866). The ellipses and bracketed
words delete references to exceptions provided in the Fifth Amendment for cases
involving military personnel.
29. 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
30. "The States, so far as [the seventh] amendment is concerned, are left to
regulate trials in their own courts in their own way. A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the State courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship ...
." Walker, 92 U.S. at 92. Though Walker is a civil contempt
case, it was cited along with criminal contempt and ordinary criminal cases discussing the jury issue. See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)
(citing Walker for the proposition, in dicta, that trial by jury might be abolished by a
state).
31.
101 U.S. 22 (1879).
32. See Lewis, 101 U.S. at 31-32. The issue in the case was whether the State
of Missouri could condition appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court from the St.
Louis Court of Appeals on the amount in controversy or the presence of a state
constitutional question. Residents who appealed from other districts in the state
could appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court on any issue. The United States Supreme Court upheld Missouri's unique arrangement. See id. at 33.
33.
139 U.S. 621 (1891).
34. Natal, 139 U.S. at 623-24. Here, the phrase "states where the common law
prevails" merely marks the difference between Louisiana's legal history and that of
the rest of the states.
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Louisiana moved the Court to incorporate the Sixth Amendment
jury provision upon the states,35 the Court placed no limits on
state legislative powers where the jury right was concerned.
If the states were not obliged to provide jury trial for citizens
under their legislative authority, was the federal government
obliged to provide jury trial for the few citizens living under its
exclusive authority in the District of Columbia?" Twenty-two
years after Field sang the praises of the jury right, 7 James C.
Callan appeared before the Supreme Court after the police court
of the District of Columbia denied him a jury trial.3 8 He was
charged by information with conspiracy," convicted by the police court judge, and sentenced to pay a fine of $25; he refused to
do so and was jailed for thirty days.4" The government argued
that the Constitution's broad, liberal language did not protect
residents of the District of Columbia but only residents of the
states.4 ' The Constitution, under this argument, did not mean
literally "all crimes," but only "whatever crimes occur within the
states." Since Callan's crime did not occur in a state, the government argued, the Constitution would not protect him against
Congress' exercise of its legislative powers. The Supreme Court
rejected this proposition, using language broader than its opinions in Walker or Lewis42 might suggest:
There is nothing in the history of the constitution, or of the
original amendments, to justify the assertion that the people of
this District may be lawfully deprived of any of the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and property; especially of the
privilege of trial by jury in criminal cases.'
The Court refused to allow the police court to impose a meager
thirty-day sentence and stood firm on Callan's constitutional jury
right."

35. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also infra Part III.A.
36. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548 (1888).
37. See supra pp. 5-6.
38.
See Callan, 127 U.S. at 547.
39. Callan and several compatriots, under the name 'Sanctuary Washington Musical Assembly,' a branch of the Knights of Labor, leaned on a few other musicians
who were uncooperative when the Assembly suggested each of them should contribute $25 to the general fund. See id. at 540.
40. See id.
41.
See id. at 548.
42. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22
(1879); see also supra p. 6.
43.
Callan, 127 U.S. at 550.
44.
The government also argued that Callan's jury right was not violated be-
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The Callan opinion, though, granted the federal government
its broader argument: that the Constitution did not mean every
crime when it said "all crimes." The Court merely shifted its
inquiry to the word "crimes." "The word 'crime,' in its more extended sense, comprehends every violation of public law; in a
limited sense, it embraces offenses of a serious or atrocious character." To figure out which crime was which, the Court would
consult the common law." Thus, Callan restricts the scope of
the jury clauses even while emphasizing the historical and constitutional sanctity of the jury right.47 The petty offense doctrine, announced for the first time in 1888, denies jury trial for
crimes that were not tried by a jury at common law.
Despite some persuasive arguments challenging the legitimacy of interpreting the Constitution in light of the common
law," and arguments challenging the legitimacy of the petty
offense doctrine specifically,49 a doctrine that has stood for so

cause he was entitled to a jury on appeal to the supreme court of the District. See
Callan, 127 U.S. at 556-57. (Callan did appeal, but he withdrew his appeal before it
could be heard by a jury.) See id. at 540. This argument too the Court rejected,
quoting a long passage from a decision by Justice Blatchford of the Southern District
of New York. That decision refused a warrant authorizing the extradition of Charles
Dana, publisher of the New York Times, to the District of Columbia on a libel
charge, on the ground that extradition would deprive Dana of his constitutional right
to a jury. The court insisted Dana was entitled to be tried and acquitted by a jury
in the first instance and should not have to wait for an acquittal by an appellate
jury. See In re Dana, 6 F. Cas. 1140, 1141-42 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3,554), quoted
in Callan, 127 U.S. at 554.
45. Callan, 127 U.S. at 549.
46. See id.
47. The Court couched its decision in concessions:
Without further reference to the authorities, and conceding that there is a
class of petty or minor offenses not usually embraced in public criminal
statutes, and not of the class or grade triable common law [sic] by a jury,
and which, if committed in this District, may, under the authority of congress, be tried by the court and without a jury, we are of opinion that the
offense with which the appellant is charged does not belong to that
class ....
When, therefore, the appellant was brought before the supreme
court of the District, and the fact was disclosed that he had been adjudged
guilty of the crime of conspiracy . . . without ever having been tried by a
jury, he should have been restored to his liberty.
Callan, 127 U.S. at 555-57. It is ironic that Justice Harlan should have been the
author of the majority opinion in Callan. He would later regret it. See infra pp. 9-10.
48. James Madison opposed a constitutional provision which would have adopted the common law wholesale, on the ground that the common law would import "a
thousand heterogeneous & antirepublican doctrines." Letter from James Madison to
George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197
(1977).
49. As one modem commentator has asked, "If the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention wanted to close a loophole in the common-law right to a jury trial,
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long will almost certainly not be reconsidered by the Court today. Consequently, the following exploration of the doctrine's
history will focus on a previously unremarked theme in its development after Callan: the role of the legislature in defining petty
offenses, both at common law and under the Constitution.
B. Common Law Petty Offenses and Legislative Authority
When Justice Harlan announced the petty offense doctrine
in the Callan opinion, the offense's status at common law was
the only criterion he proposed to differentiate petty from serious
offenses. 0 Once he had done a little more research, Justice
Harlan realized that the only offenses tried without a jury at
common law were those the legislature singled out to be so
tried.51 The common law presumed a right to trial by jury, and
only a statute of Parliament could rebut the presumption.
Justice Harlan's second thoughts appeared in his dissenting
opinion in Schick v. United States,5 2 where he questioned
whether a defendant and the government could agree to waive
the jury right, since the constitutional requirement of trial by
jury did not apply in all cases. The majority found no reason
even to raise such a question: "[w]e entertain no doubt that the
parties could rightfully make such a waiver and the judgments
are in no way invalidated thereby."" Citing Blackstone's re-

what language would have accomplished that purpose?" Lynch, supra note 10, at 14.
Notwithstanding such plain language, Callan pruned back the jury right to conform
with common law. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917
(1926).
50. See Callan, 127 U.S. at 549.
51.
See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 80 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52.
195 U.S. 65 (1904). The Court decided Schick along with several other cases
questioning the constitutionality of federal legislation regulating the packaging and
sale of oleomargarine. Neither of the parties had assigned error to the waiver; the
Court itself, most likely Justice Harlan, noticed the issue and requested briefing on
it. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 67. Schick, incidentally, contains a brilliant example of
the rhetoric typical of the era of economic due process. To a twentieth-century ear
tuned to the jury right as an individual's civil right or a human right, Schick's indignation on behalf of his greasy commodity sounds ridiculous: "[T]he defendant in each
case moved the court to render a verdict and judgment of not guilty and that he be
discharged, upon the ground that the above act of Congress . . . so arbitrarily discriminated against oleomargarine in favor of butter as to be repugnant to the fundamental principles of equality and justice that were inherent in the Constitution." Id.
at 73. Packed with rabid pro-butterites, the Court held the act was a constitutionally
valid exercise of legislative power. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63-64
(1904).
53. Id. at 67.
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marks on the word "crime,"' the majority concluded that the
linguistic revision between Article III's "all crimes" and the Sixth
Amendment's "all criminal offenses" made the petty offense doctrine "obvious," that is, made it obvious that low-grade crimes
need not be tried by juries.5 5 Moreover, the majority refused to
dignify Schick's transgression with the name of "criminal offense." Schick had merely committed an "offense." Therefore, the
Sixth Amendment jury clause was not binding on him or the
government, and the two could legitimately agree to a bench
trial. 6 The majority thus grounded its entire discussion on the
assertion that the petty offense doctrine was "obvious."57
But for Justice Harlan, the real question was whether there
should be any such thing as an exclusively judicial petty offense
doctrine in the first place. Harlan's dissent argued that the
legislature's decision should be paramount:
I assert, with confidence, that no precedent can be found at
common law for the trial by the court, without a jury, of any
crimes except those described... as minor or petty offenses
involved in the internal police of the state, and those could be
tried... without the intervention of a jury, only when thereunto authorized by an act of Parliament. Except in cases of

contempt, the common law, Blackstone says, was a stranger to
the summary proceedings authorized by acts of Parliament....
I am not aware of, nor has there been cited, any case in England in which, after Magna Charta, and prior to the adoption of
our Constitution, a court, tribunal, officer, or commissioner has,
without a jury, even in the case of a petty offense, determined

the question of crime or no crime, when the defendant pleaded
not guilty, unless the authority to do so was expressly conferred
by an act of Parliament."
54. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5, cited in Schick, 195 U.S. at
69-70.
55. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 69-70.
56. Some circuits relied on Schick to hold that defendants could not waive the
jury right if they were accused of a serious offense. See, e.g., Coates v. United
States, 290 F. 134 (4th Cir. 1923); Low v. United States, 169 F. 86 (6th Cir. 1909);
Dickinson v. United States, 159 F. 801 (1st Cir. 1908). This rule controlled in these
circuits until the Supreme Court decided that the line between petty and serious
offenses (wherever it might be), or that between felonies and misdemeanors, should
not prevent a defendant accused of a serious offense from waiving his right to jury
trial. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), overruled on other grounds by
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
57. See Schick, 195 U.S. at 67. A later case, Singer v. United States, confirmed
that both parties must agree to waive jury trial if the offense is serious enough to
require jury trial under the Constitution and if the defendant gives no reason for
waiving jury trial other than saving time. See 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
58. Schick, 195 U.S. at 80 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing 4 WILLIAM
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Legislative authorization for a court to try an offense without a
jury was a jurisdictional prerequisite at common law. Hence, it
made no sense to speak of waiver of jury trial apart from an
express Congressional provision for waiver.5 9 A mere pact between a prosecutor and a defendant could not confer jurisdiction
upon a court to try the matter any more than an assumption of
jurisdiction by a panel of laypersons could.' If the Court was
going to follow the common law in deciding the jury issue, it had
first to presume that jury trial was required; only if Congress
specifically provided for bench trial of the offense could that
procedure be used, and even then, the power of Congress was
limited by the Constitution. The Court's real role was to draw
the constitutional line beyond which Congress had to allow trial

by jury.
The Schick majority sought to respect common law precedent on the petty offense doctrine; Justice Harlan, in dissent,
insisted that the majority failed to do so. If Justice Harlan was
right, Clavette wields a historical entitlement to invoke 18
U.S.C. § 19 as the legislature's demarcation between serious and
petty offenses. Was Justice Harlan's thesis correct? Did the
Schick majority fail to realize the direct role of the legislature in
defining petty offenses at common law?
The answer is suggested in an influential article co-authored
by Felix Frankfurter 6 and Thomas G. Corcoran.62 Frankfurter

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280) (emphases added).
59. See id. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. See id.
61. Many years later, Justice Frankfurter referred to Justice Harlan as an
"eccentric exception" among the forty-three justices who had sat on the Court since
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
62 (1947)), because Justice Harlan was the only one who believed it wholly incorporated the first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights upon the States. Justice
Frankfurter's observation is qualified by Justice Black's thoroughly researched dissent
in the same case. See id. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 92-123 (demonstrating in appendix that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended wholly
to incorporate the first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights upon the States and
resisting the majority's selective incorporation). In the jury right context, Justice
Frankfurter's reasons for thinking Justice Harlan eccentric are probably best illustrated by Justice Harlan's dissent in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), where he
invokes the sanctity of the jury at common law and the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to contest the majority's conclusion that State
juries may be composed of eight persons without infringing on constitutional privileges and immunities. See id. at 605-17.
62. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49. The Supreme Court has relied on
the article in opinions dealing with the petty offense doctrine. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 n.1 (1937); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
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and Corcoran were not looking for the common law role of the
legislature in defining petty offenses, but they found it. Frankfurter and Corcoran assumed the Constitution demanded a certain minimal liberalism where the jury right was concerned, and
they assumed Congress wanted to narrow the jury right as far as
possible: "[tlo what extent, if at all, may Congress under the
Federal Constitution adopt... [bench trial] procedure... ?'
This, at least, was their concern in the article's main text. But
the clearest message of their research surfaces in the appendices.
The appendices attempt to list each offense that was tried without a jury in the colonial and revolutionary eras in New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Hundreds of offenses are
listed." The study provides strong historical evidence that the

145, 159 & n.31 (1968).
63. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49, at 920.
64. These examples were selected to demonstrate the general framework of the
legislation in each of the four represented colonies and to give a small flavor of the
particular offenses tried without a jury:
1 Colonial Laws of New York 174 (1685). Swearing. is. or if unable to pay, 3
hours in stocks or public whipping for children; single justice or mayor. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49, at 984.
1785 Laws, c. 81. Firing guns for New Year's celebration. 40s. or in default, 1
month; half to informer, half to poor; single justice. See Frankfurter & Corcoran,
supra note 49, at 988.
3 Charter and Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania, c. 245, § 4 (1721). Selling fireworks without license; 5s.; single justice. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra
note 49, at 991.
1 Maryland Archives, Proceedings and Acts of the Assembly of Maryland 52
(1638). An Act for the Authority of the Justices of the Peace. "[T]he offences following in this Act may be heard and determined by the Lieutenant Generall for the
time being or by any one of the Councill or by any one haveing Commission for the
peace under the great Seal of this Province and the offender may be convicted by
the view or hearing of the Judge or confesion of the Offender or Evidence of the fact
or by the testimony of one wittness to which purport every of the said Judges
aforenamed shall have power by vertue of this Act . . . and to commit any offender
to prison till he submit himself to good order or find Security for his good
abbearance and to take and demand recognisances to that purpose and to keep a
Record of all fines and sentences . .. ."
The above Act enumerated the following offenses as punishable by Justices of
the Peace:
1. Threatening to harm the person or goods of another . ...
2. Residing among Indians without the consent of the Lord Proprietary . ...
3. Swearing ....
4. Drunkenness . . ..
5. Fornication ....
6. Adultery ....
7. Refusal properly to care for servants . ...
8. Refusal of servants to perform lawful command ....
9. Labor on Sabbath or other holy days . ...
10. Eating flesh in Lent or on other days forbidden by English law . ...
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legislature both defined the offense and set out the manner of its
trial if the offense was to be prosecuted without a jury. Hence,
Justice Harlan's dissent in Schick appears to be correct: at common law, offenses were probably tried by jury unless the legislature expressly authorized bench trial.
Moreover, contrary to the Supreme Court's exclusive focus
today on the statute defining the offense, legislative authorization for trial without a jury was occasionally codified in a different statute. In Pennsylvania, for instance, the provincial assembly authorized justices of the peace to try offenses punishable by
fines up to 20 shillings, from 1700-1735,"5 and then by fines up
to 5 pounds, beginning in 1735-36.' In 1779, the state legislature authorized bench trials for offenses entailing fines up to 50
pounds; 7 two years later, it revoked that authority.' Another,
more modest proposal in 1784 gave justices of the peace jurisdiction to try offenses entailing up to 10 pounds in fines. 9 That
authorization too was revoked in 1785,0 then reinstated with
the qualification that a defendant might appeal an assessment of
fine or imposition of prison time to a court where he would be
entitled to a jury.71 Congress' statutory scheme today mirrors
Pennsylvania's 1785 scheme. Congress' statutes defining offenses
contain no legislative evaluation of the penalty authorized; petty
offenses are identified at 18 U.S.C. § 19.
C. A Rule from the Early Decisions:The Court Prevents
Congress from Denying the Jury Right in Serious Cases
Except for Schick, where the majority found no federal statute authorizing bench trial but granted it anyway, all of the
Supreme Court's early decisions under the petty offense doctrine

11. Raising an alarm without cause by shooting of guns ....
12. Fishing with seines or other unlawful nets ....
1 Maryland Archives, Proceedings and Acts of the Assembly of Maryland 53, 54
(1638). See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49, at 999-1000.
29 Car. 2, Act 5. Justice of peace getting drunk on court day so as to be incapable of sitting; 500 pounds tobacco for first offense, 1,000 for second, and 2,000 and
loss of office for third; imposed by the other members of the county court. See
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49, at 1015.
65.
See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 49, at 989.
66. See id.
67.
See id. at 996.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70.
See id.
71.
See id.
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recognize the principle that only a legislative act can rebut the
common law presumption for jury trial. For example, in Walker, 2 Lewis,73 and Natal,4 the three early cases concerning
state statutes, the Court acknowledged the authority of state legislatures to decide which offenses should be tried by jury and
which by a judge. In the three cases that originated in the District of Columbia, 5 Congress' municipal regulations were measured against the jury clauses of the Constitution to determine
whether legislative restriction of the jury right had gone too far.
In each case, the court presumed the legislature had the authority to deny jury trial unless the common law had expanded the
jury right. Nonetheless, the common law presumption was destroyed in Schick, because the majority opinion did not take up
Justice Harlan's challenge to show a common law crime which
was tried summarily without Parliament's authorization. Instead, the Court approved of trial without jury - by, one should
remember, the defendant's and government's voluntary waiver of
jury trial - even though no federal statute authorized bench
trial.
Fortunately, Schick's unwitting destruction of the common
law presumption for jury trial was not harmful. The District of
Columbia's municipal regulations still confined the Court to its
proper, organic role in the petty offense doctrine. Congress provided for jury trial if "according to the Constitution of the United
States, the accused would be entitled to a jury trial." 6 If the
Constitution did not entitle the defendant to a jury trial, neither
would Congress, "unless, in cases where the fine or penalty may
be more than $300 or imprisonment more than ninety days, the
accused shall demand a trial by jury."" In other words, for cases where Parliament had authorized bench trial and where the
penalty was less than $300 or ninety days, Congress acquiesced
with the Court in denying jury trial. Interpreting these municipal regulations, the Court had to decide whether a particular
offense was serious enough to require jury trial even though
Congress had authorized bench trial.

72.
73.
74.
75.
282 U.S.
76.
77.

Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); District of Columbia v. Colts,
63 (1930); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 165 (1930).
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 165 (1930).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1998

15

358

MONTANA
LAW
Montana
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
59 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 7

[Vol. 59

For instance, in District of Columbia v. Colts,78 the Court
considered whether reckless driving, punishable by a fine of $25
to $100 and by imprisonment for ten to thirty days,79 required
jury trial even though the penalties clearly fell below the line at
which Congress granted jury trial. The Court held that Congress
could not authorize summary prosecution for reckless driving
offenses because the common law had required jury trial "when
horses, instead of gasoline, constituted the motive power."0
Likewise, when Ethel Clawans was prosecuted for selling
the unused portions of railway tickets without a license, the
Court had to decide whether she was entitled to a jury even
though the maximum penalty was a fine up to $300 and up to
ninety days in jail,"1 short of the municipal regulations' entitlement to jury trial.82 Citing Blackstone, Paley, and a treatise on
municipal corporations," the Court held that the offense did not
require jury trial at common law.' But this did not end the
Court's inquiry:
[T]his Court has refused to foreclose consideration of the severity of the penalty as an element to be considered in determining
whether a statutory offense, in other respects trivial and not a
crime at common law, must be deemed so serious as to be comparable with common-law crimes, and thus to entitle the accused to the benefit of a jury trial prescribed by the Constitution."
If the penalty was severe enough, the Court would invoke the
Constitution to prevent Congress from denying jury trial. In both
Colts and Clawans -

indeed, in all of the early cases -

the

Court plays precisely the role it ought to play, the role of watchdog over Congress' denials of jury trial.8 "
78. 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
79. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6, § 246(c) (1930).
80. See Colts, 282 U.S. at 73. The Court implies both that reckless driving was
an indictable offense at common law and that indictable offenses required jury trial.
See id. at 73 (citing State v. Rodgers, 102 A. 433 (N.J. 1917)).
81. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); D.C. Mun. Regs.
tit. 20, §§ 1739, 1755-1756 (Supp. II 1936).
82. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 165 (1930).
83. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624 n.1.
84. See id. at 624-25.
85. Id. at 625 (citing Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904)).
86. Even in Schick, the Court played this role. There was no statute authorizing trial without jury, and the Court (mistakenly, as Justice Harlan argues) reversed
the common law presumption for jury trial. Beyond that point, however, the Court
continued its inquiry by asking whether common law would have required jury trial
and whether the punishment was light or severe. See United States v. Schick, 195
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. In these early days of the petty offense doctrine, then, the
Court never had to guess, as all courts must today, whether the
legislature which defined the offense thought it was a serious
one.87 At $300 and/or ninety days, Congress had clearly indicated which offenses were serious and which petty for purposes of
the federal jury right. The Court only had to decide when to
confer the jury right despite Congress' denial of it. To make that
decision, the Court asked whether Parliament, at common law,
authorized trial without jury for the particular offense; and,
beyond that, it inquired whether the penalty was so serious that
the Constitution required trial by jury, regardless of the offense's
status at common law and even in the face of legislative denial
of jury trial. The common law presumption for jury trial and for
legislative input into the determination of the jury right,"
though weakly articulated, was fully intact when the Court,
satisfied with its work, put the petty offense doctrine on the
shelf in 1937.89

III. THE PERVERSION OF THE PETTY OFFENSE DOCTRINE:
JUDICIAL USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE

Never having spelled out the proper role of the legislature in
the petty offense doctrine, the Supreme Court, after Clawans in
1937, did not hear a case involving the doctrine for twenty-eight
years. When the doctrine surfaced again, two circumstances
overwhelmed it. First, from 1965 to 1975, the Court considered
the doctrine in only two unique contexts: criminal contempt and
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment upon the States. Second,
as the Court moved through these cases, it became careless with
its citations. After 1975, the Court did not deal with the petty
offense doctrine until 1989, in Blanton v. City of North Las Ve-

U.S. 65, 67-68 (1904). The statute under which Schick was prosecuted authorized a
fine of $50. See id. at 67.
87. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989). Much has
been made of the difficulty of comparing common law offenses to contemporary ones.
See, e.g., id. at 541 & n.5 (citing Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209-10 (8th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989)). Under the analysis presented in this Comment, that problem is resolved by contemporary legislative evaluations
of various penalties' seriousness.
88. These presumptions surfaced in lower courts' decisions for more than sixty
years after their apparent destruction in Schick. See, e.g., United States v. Floyd,
477 F.2d 217, 222 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1339
n.4 (D. Md. 1978); United States v. Bishop, 261 F.Supp. 969, 975-76 (N.D. Cal.
1966).
89. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
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gas.9" When the Court established the Blanton presumption
against jury trial for offenses authorizing prison terms of six
months or less, it relied on careless citations in its 1965-1975
decisions. These decisions, in turn, result in grave contemporary
affronts to Congress' definition of petty offenses in 18 U.S.C. §
19. Since Blanton, the Seventh, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held that fines of $10,000 or even
$25,000 do not clearly indicate that the offense is serious enough
to trigger the jury right, even though Congress' definition of
petty offenses encompasses fines only up to $5,000.
A. Criminal Contempt and Careless Citation, 1965-1975
After a hiatus of twenty-eight years, the Supreme Court took
up the petty offense doctrine in the midst of special circumstances that eventually proved disastrous for its development. Each
case in this period concerned either criminal contempt, where
the legislature has no role in evaluating the offense,9 ' or the
incorporation doctrine, where the Court compelled state legislatures to respect the Sixth Amendment and the common law
boundaries of the jury right. As a result, from 1965 to 1975, the
Court built up a body of case law on the petty offense doctrine eight cases in ten years - in which legislative authority held a
precarious position. Though almost all of the cases acknowledge
legislative authority, the Court's careful reasoning processes are
soon truncated by careless citation. In fact, this era culminates
in Muniz v. Hoffman, 2 a decision the circuit courts take as license to ignore Congress' definition of petty offenses.
With the exception of Muniz, the opinions written in this era
demonstrate remarkable deference to the legislative role in evaluating offenses as petty or serious for the purposes of the constitutional right to jury trial. Even in the contempt cases, where

90. 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
91.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1994). Criminal contempt is a statutorily recognized crime, but the legislature makes no provision for its trial or punishment; it
merely confers jurisdiction on the courts. The initiation of the charge and the penalty
are entirely within the discretion of the contemned and sentencing courts. And, usually, the contemned and sentencing judge are one and the same. But see, e.g.,
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (remanding for trial by a different
judge after contemned judge sentenced three contemnors to eleven to twenty-two
years, seven to fourteen years, and six to twelve years for, among other things,
threatening his life). The offense is therefore practically the exclusive province of the
judiciary, and to develop the petty offense doctrine in the context of such an offense
invites judicial usurpation of the legislature's role.
92. 422 U.S. 454 (1975). See infra notes 115-130 and accompanying text.
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the statute defining the offense contains no penalty range, the
Court seeks out the legislature's evaluation of the penalty actually imposed by looking at Congress' definition of petty offenses.
The Court's first consideration of the petty offense doctrine in
9 3 relied on
the context of contempt, Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
Congress' definition: "[a]ccording to 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964 ed.),
'(a)ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months' is a 'petty offense."9 4 In
the absence of a compelling argument for treating contempt as if
it were always serious enough to require jury trial,9 5 the Court
respected Congress' definition and denied Cheff a jury trial."
Unfortunately, the Cheff Court went on to say that their
decision left an open question as to whether contempts punished
by more than six months' imprisonment could be tried without a
jury:
At the same time, we recognize that by limiting our opinion to
those cases where a sentence not exceeding six months is imposed we leave the federal courts at sea in instances involving
greater sentences. Effective administration compels us to express a view on that point. Therefore, in the exercise of the
Court's supervisory power and under the peculiar power of the
federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases, we rule
further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be97imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial
or waiver thereof.
This is where the unique nature of criminal contempt confuses
the jury right issue. Are the federal courts left "at sea" because
Congress' definition of petty offenses does not apply in contempt
cases? Or are they at sea because Congress' definition is not constitutionally effective in any case?

93. 384 U.S. 373 (1966). The doctrine appeared in Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24 (1965), as a collateral issue. Like Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65
(1904), Singer concerned waiver of the jury right, questioning whether a defendant
who wanted to waive jury trial needed the government's consent. See Singer, 380
U.S. at 25; see also supra note 57.
94. Cheff, 384 U.S. at 379.
95. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). In Barnett, the Court
determined that no constitutional right to jury trial attached to criminal contempt
sui generis. See id. at 692. It noted, however, that the severity of the penalty actually imposed might confer the constitutional jury right. See id. at 694-95 n.12. Cheff
sought a decision on that issue, and the Court invoked the petty offense doctrine to
deny Cheff a jury trial because he was sentenced to only six months. See Cheff, 384
U.S. at 380.
96. See id.
97. Id.
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The Court's next three decisions9 8 - all issued on May 20,
1968 - did not confront the question directly, but Duncan v.
Louisiana," the leading case, indicates that legislative evaluations of the penalty are a crucial component in the constitutional
determination of the right to jury trial. These three decisions
impose upon the states the common law requirement for jury
trial in cases involving certain offenses or punishments. The
Duncan Court held that "a crime punishable by two years in
prison is, based on past and contemporary standards in this
country, a serious crime and not a petty offense."" The Court
did not say just when the Constitution required jury trial. It simply concluded that the Constitution required jury trial of offenses
punishable by a prison term of two years, and that Duncan, who
could have received two years, was therefore entitled to a jury
trial.01 To reach that decision, the Court looked to Congress'
definition of petty offenses at 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) and to the states'
constitutions and statutory schemes, all but one of which Louisiana's - guaranteed jury trial for all crimes punishable by
more than one year in jail.0 2
Similarly, in Bloom v. Illinois," another contempt case,
the Court preserved the subtle but crucial distinction between
the penalty itself and the legislatures' evaluations of the penalty.
The rule of the case refers to the absence of a legislatively prescribed penalty: "When the legislature has not expressed a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum
penalty which may be imposed, we are to look to the penalty
actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the
offense."'O' The rule fits the case; the contemnor was sentenced

98. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). The decision in
Dyke concerned a Tennessee statute which set a maximum sentence on contempts of
ten days and $50. The Court invoked the rule of Cheff, which cited 18 U.S.C. § 1 in
holding contempts punished by six months or less in prison triable without a jury as
petty offenses. See supra p. 16.
99. Gary Duncan, a nineteen-year-old African-American man, was charged with
battery for slapping the elbow of a white boy while steering his two young cousins
away from a fight with three more white boys. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147. Battery
was punishable by two years' imprisonment. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West
1950).
100. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added).
101. See id. at 162.
102. See id. at 161. At the time of the Duncan decision, the Louisiana Constitution granted a right to jury trial only in cases where hard labor or the death penalty could be imposed. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41 (1921).
103.
391 U.S. 194 (1968).
104. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211.
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to two years, the Court relied on Duncan to say two years' imprisonment required jury trial, and Duncan cited the collective
evaluation of the state and federal legislatures to hold that a
possible two-year sentence triggered the Constitution's jury
clauses. Unfortunately, the reasoning was too far removed from
the "plain language" of the Bloom decision to be picked up by
courts citing it in the future. Courts cite Bloom primarily to
establish that contempt cannot be punished by serious criminal
penalties unless the defendant is granted a jury trial.1" 5
The same fate - careless citation - befell Frank v. United
States,"° the case most articulately expressing the legislative
role in evaluating offenses as petty or serious and thus in determining the jury right under the Constitution. The phrase most
often cited from the Frank opinion is the observation that the
legislature "include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a
judgment about the seriousness of the offense,"0 7 that is, the
maximum authorized penalty. The quotation, or a close paraphrase, appears in four of the Supreme Court's five petty offense
decisions following Frank. But it is not the holding in the case;
its only function in the opinion is to distinguish contempt from
the ordinary criminal prosecution for an offense and penalty
defined by the legislature. Even worse, courts citing this phrase
fail to acknowledge that a crucial citation to Duncan accompanies it: "a crime punishable by two years in prison is, based on
past and contemporary standardsin this country, a serious crime
and not a petty offense.""° Citing this phrase from Frank without the accompanying Duncan citation cuts off the Court's recognition of legislative authority to decide which offenses are serious and which are petty.
In contrast to this most-cited phrase, the whole of the Frank
opinion relies entirely on statutes indicating whether Congress
evaluated the penalty imposed on Frank as serious or petty.

105. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833 (1994);
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1974); Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1968).
106. 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
107. Frank, 395 U.S. at 149. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970);
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); United States v.
Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3 (1993); Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2166
(1996). The sole exception is Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), which does not
distinguish Frank in any way from any other case involving trial of contempts as
petty offenses.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968), cited in Frank, 395 U.S. at
108.
149 (emphasis added).
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Frank was sentenced to a three-year term of probation for criminal contempt. The Court reasoned that he was not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, because Congress had not determined
that a probationary sentence was a serious punishment:
Congress, in making the probation statute applicable to "any
offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment," clearly
made it apply to petty, as well as more serious, offenses. In so
doing, it did not indicate that the additional penalty of a term
of probation was to place otherwise petty offenses in the "serious" category. In other words, Congress decided that petty
offenses may be punished by any combination of penalties authorized by 18 U.S.C. s 1 and 18 U.S.C. s 3651. Therefore, the
maximum penalty authorized in petty offense cases is not simply six months' imprisonment and a $500 fine. A petty offender
may be placed on probation for up to five years and, if the
terms of probation are violated, he may then be imprisoned for
six months.1"
Throughout the opinion, the Frank Court repeatedly referred to
legislative indications of pettiness and seriousness: "[niumerous
federal and state statutory schemes allow significant periods of
probation to be imposed for otherwise petty offenses;""' "[i]n
noncontempt cases, Congress has not viewed the possibility of
five years' probation as onerous enough to make an otherwise
petty offense 'serious.' This Court is ill-equipped to make a contrary determination for contempt cases;""' and, in the holding,
"Petitioner's sentence is within the limits of the congressional
definition of petty offenses. Accordingly, it was not error to deny
him a jury trial.""2
Even the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren involves
the construction of Congress' definition of petty offenses. First,
he argues, Congress' failure to mention probation in its definition of petty offenses does not necessarily mean that Congress

109. Frank, 395 U.S. at 150-51 (citation omitted). At the time of the Frank decision, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 was one of a handful of statutes delineating the courts' roles
in suspending sentences and imposing probation; most of these were repealed when
the Sentencing Guidelines were implemented. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. 98-473, § 212(aX2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). Compare Blanton v. City of North
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) with United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993)
(even harsh conditions of probation do not make a petty offense serious). 18 U.S.C. §
1, of course, defined petty offenses as those entailing prison terms of six months or
less and fines of $500 or less.
110. Frank, 395 U.S. at 150.
111. Id. at 151-52.
112. Id. at 152.
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considered probation appropriate only for petty offenses. Congress might have intended the addition of probation to make an
otherwise petty offense into a serious one:
There simply is no indication in the statute itself or in its legislative history that 18 U.S.C. § 3651 was intended to modify,
complement, add to, or even relate to the petty offense definition, or any definition, in 18 U.S.C. § 1 .... More importantly,
however, there is every indication that Congress affirmatively
determined that probation should not affect its earlier definitions by making probation freely available to virtually all
crimes - including most felonies not thereby rendered "petty"
because of probation's imposition."'
Second, Chief Justice Warren invoked the Court's proper judicial
role under the petty offense doctrine. That Congress evaluates
an offense or penalty as petty is not constitutionally conclusive;
Congress' power to deny jury trial is still limited by the
judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution's jury clauses:
[E]ven if Congress did "add" probation to the "petty" offense
definition, the expanded definition would not necessarily be as
binding on us as the Court seems to suggest.... We cannot, it
seems to me, place unlimited reliance on legislative definitions
and "existing.

.

. practices in the Nation" and thereby allow

Congress and the States to rewrite the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution by simply terming "petty" any offense regardless
of the underlying sentence."1
Clearly, though Frank is most often cited to focus judicial attention exclusively on the statute defining the offense, the opinion
actually gives its full attention to other statutes that indicate
whether Congress evaluates the authorized penalty as serious or
petty.

113. Id. at 156 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren also expressed concern
over the petty offense doctrine itself; he was sure it would be used to "hamstring[]
protest groups" who exercised their constitutional right to be heard. His fears may
have been well-grounded. See, for instance, United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513
(D.C. Cir. 1989), decided just after Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538
(1989). Musser, participating in an antinuclear demonstration, was charged with
having an unattended sign in Lafayette Park, across the street from the White
House. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(x)(B)(2) (1986). He was convicted on evidence tending to show he was slightly more than three feet away from the sign for thirty seconds to one minute. He was subject to a penalty of six months' imprisonment and/or

$500.
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3. Muniz v. Hoffman (1975): Legislative Evaluation of the
Penalty Disappears into a Meaningless String of Citations
Injudicious citation practices, however, eventually pushed
the legislature out of the petty offense doctrine altogether. In a
1975 decision, Muniz v. Hoffman,"1 the central question was
whether Congress, when it amended certain provisions which
both authorized injunctions against labor unions and granted
jury trial to persons accused of violating the injunctions, intended to revoke the statutory jury right. 6 The Court held that
Congress did revoke the previous grant of jury trial, and the
union therefore was not statutorily entitled to jury trial."7 As a
backup argument, the union had also pled its constitutional right
to jury trial. At the end of the primary question of statutory construction, the Court had to decide whether the Constitution required8 jury trial for a 13,000-member union facing a $10,000
fine."
Oddly, the Court did not attempt to assess the seriousness of
the offense, as its previous cases had done." 9 Instead, it treated the union's constitutional entitlement as if it had something
to do with the "seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation" 2 ' the fine would impose. The Court admitted
it had, in the past, looked to "the relevant rules and practices
followed by the federal and state regimes, including the definition of petty offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1(3). " "21 However, disturbed by the prospect of applying Congress' $500 limit'22 to
115.
422 U.S. 454 (1975). To do the Court justice, Congress had been asleep at
the switch for forty-five years when Muniz was decided. The amount of fine in the
definition of petty offenses had not been changed since 1930; it was still $500. See
Pub. L. 71-548, 46 Stat. 1029, 1030 (1930).
116.
See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 461.
See id. at 474 (18 U.S.C. § 3692 "does not provide for trial by jury in con117.
tempt proceedings brought to enforce an injunction issued at the behest of the [National Labor Relations] Board in a labor dispute arising under the Labor Management Relations Act").
118.
See id. at 477.
119.
Focus on the seriousness of the offense is established in the very first petty
offense case, where a $25 fine or a thirty-day prison term were not the deciding factor; the charge, conspiracy, was the deciding factor. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 555-57 (1888); see also supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text. The seriousness of the offense remains the crucial factor even today. The Blanton test asks
whether the additional penalties are so severe as to indicate that Congress considered the offense serious. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543
(1989).
See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477.
120.
Muniz, 422 U.S. at 476.
121.
122.
From 1930 to 1984, Congress' definition of petty offenses set the limit for a
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require jury trial for a wealthy union, the Court went on to contrast a fine, innocuous in this context, with the different sort of
deprivation imposed by a prison sentence:
[I]n referring to [Congress'] definition, the Court accorded it no
talismanic significance.... It is one thing to hold that deprivation of an individual's liberty should not be imposed without
the protections of a jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest
that, regardless of the circumstances, a jury is required where
any fine greater than $500 is contemplated. From the standpoint of determining the seriousness of the risk and the extent
of the possible deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment
and fine are intrinsically different.... This union. . . collects
dues from some 13,000 persons ....
The Court's emphasis on the "intrinsic" seriousness of prison is
out of place - labor unions cannot go to prison." If one analyzes the matter by looking at the seriousness of the deprivation,
however, the question is whether the fine is so high that it is
equivalent to six months' imprisonment. Yet the Court has also
said "imprisonment and fine are intrinsically different." How,
then, can the seriousness of the deprivation suffered under each
form of punishment be compared?
The confusion inherent in this analysis stems from the
Muniz Court's careless string-citation of previous cases. The
Court "capsuled"' the very complicated and careful reasoning
processes articulated in Cheff, Duncan, Bloom, Frank, and three
other cases"' into four discrete propositions, each concerning
only the special situation of contempt cases. 27 Perhaps the
Court did not intend for its holding to be extended to
noncontempt cases or to cases involving individual defendants.
Perhaps the Court was simply affronted by the claim that a

fine at $500 and did not differentiate between individual defendants and organizational defendants. Congress, at the time of the Muniz decision, also included a maximum prison term of six months in its definition. See Pub. L. No. 71-548, 46 Stat.
1029, 1030 (1930); Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984).
123. See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477.
124. Justice Black notes in his dissent that Muniz, an officer of the union who
received a sentence of one year's probation, did not raise the constitutional issue in
his appeal but stood on his statutory argument. See id. at 457, 479 n.4 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
125.
See id. at 475.
126.
These three cases were Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (see infra
note 137), Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418
U.S. 506 (1974).
127.
See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 475-76.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1998

25

368

Montana
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
59 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAW

[Vol. 59

large labor union, which could collect less than eighty cents from
each of its members to pay its $10,000 fine, was constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial.
In any case, the lack of guidance that the Ninth Circuit
panel faced in United States v. Clavette"2 originates here. The
Muniz Court single-handedly pushed Congress out of the role,
once so carefully reserved, of defining which offenses are serious
and which are petty. Muniz is now cited as license to ignore
Congress' definition of petty offenses whenever a court does not
feel morally compelled to go to the trouble of providing jury trial." After Muniz, district and circuit courts displayed considerable confusion over the significance of Congress' definition,"3
and the Court has done nothing since 1975 to dispel the impression that the definition does not command respect. Nonetheless,
in the next decision concerning the petty offense doctrine,
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,"' the Court acknowledged
the legislature's authority to evaluate offenses as petty or serious
and to grant or deny jury trial accordingly.

128.
See supra note 20.
129. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where Muniz originated and
where the union was first denied a jury trial, followed 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) perhaps more
scrupulously than any other circuit after the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit in discounting the statutory definition. See, e.g., United States v. Hamdan,
552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding a $1,000 fine serious); United States v. Craner,
652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding DUI in Yosemite National Park a serious offense
because Secretary of Interior imposed greatest penalty possible under his authority,
six months' imprisonment and/or $500); Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, amended by
825 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding $1,000 fine serious); United States v. Nachtigal,
953 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (relying on Craner to
confirm that DUI in Yosemite National Park is serious offense), overruled by 507
U.S. 1 (1993) (per curiam).
130. See, e.g., Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 543 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(accepting 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) as the best guide to a contemnor's entitlement to jury
trial until the Supreme Court clarifies Muniz and revising contemnor's sentence
downward from $5,000 to $500); Richmond Black Police Officers' Assoc. v. City of
Richmond, 548 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977) (limiting Muniz to its constitutional ground
and finding no statute entitling contemnors to jury trial where fines ranged from
$250 to $500); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding it
"not unrealistic" to assume that a fine of $500 is a serious matter for all individuals); Girard v. Goins, 575 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1978) (discussing Muniz, Hamdan, and
Douglass and finally holding that contemnors' fines ranging from $2,500 to $10,000
entitled them to jury trial); United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981)
(citing Muniz for the proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) does not end the jury right
inquiry because the constitutional right does not depend on Congressional largesse
and granting jury trial to defendant charged with driving under the influence in Yosemite National Park), disapproved in United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993)
(per curiam).
131.
489 U.S. 538 (1989).
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B. The Blanton Presumption
Even in the face of the Muniz Court's flouting of legislative
authority, the present-day Court has consistently, if implicitly,
acknowledged the role of the legislature in evaluating offenses as
petty or serious. In Blanton, now the leading case on the jury
right, the Court bowed to the authority of the legislature of the
State of Nevada:
The maximum authorized prison sentence for first-time DUI
offenders does not exceed six months. A presumption therefore
exists that the Nevada Legislature views DUI as a "petty" offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Considering the
additional statutory penalties as well, we do not believe that
the Nevada Legislature has clearly indicated that DUI is a
"serious" offense. 32
This statement would be peculiar indeed were it not for the
unique nature of the petty offense doctrine. Ordinarily, of course,
it is not up to the Supreme Court to interpret the expressions of
state legislatures; nor is it up to state legislatures to determine
the scope of the United States Constitution for their citizens not, at least, since Duncan incorporated the Sixth Amendment
jury right upon the states." But where the petty offense doctrine is concerned, no court can proceed without first ascertaining the relevant legislature's evaluation of the offense in question. Beyond that point, of course, a court may hold that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial because the penalties imposed are
so severe that the Constitution overrides the legislature's evaluation. In Blanton, the Court did nothing more than follow those
principles.
Still, the taint of the Muniz decision remains. The Blanton
Court emphasized the prison term authorized for the offense and
suggested that a court may examine the penalty in isolation from
the rest of the statutory scheme:
Penalties such as probation or a fine may engender "a significant infringement of personal freedom".., but they cannot
approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term
entails. Indeed, because incarceration is an "intrinsically different" form of punishment... it is the most powerful indication
whether an offense is "serious." "

132.
133.
134.

Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542 (citations to Frank and Muniz omitted).
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Hence, the "Blanton presumption" allows a court to deny jury
trial if the offense is punishable by a maximum prison term of
six months or less. A defendant can rebut the presumption only
if he can convince the court that other penalties, in addition to
the maximum prison term, are so severe as to indicate that the
legislature, in defining and authorizing such penalties for the
offense, considered the offense "serious." The Court acknowledged the standard was loose, but thought it would result in jury
trial "in the rare situation where a legislature packs an offense it
deems 'serious' with onerous penalties that nonetheless 'do not
puncture the 6-month incarceration line.'"1" Blanton was subject to a prison term of only six months or less or, as an alternative to prison, forty-eight hours' community service while dressed
in special clothing designating him as a DUI offender; a fine of
up to $1,000; and special conditions of probation, including an
educational course on alcohol abuse and loss of his license for
ninety days.1"" His vulnerability to these weighty penalties did
not entitle him to jury trial because, according to the Court, they
did not clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense
was serious." 7
Although the theoretical orientation of the Blanton opinion
strongly favors legislative influence in questioning whether an
offense is serious, the Court does not appear to search for any
Nevada statute defining petty offenses;1" the Court looks only

135. Id. at 543.
136. See id. at 540-41.
137. With the sole exception of Blanton's $1,000 fine, the territory covered in
Blanton had already been mapped in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality opinion), and United States v. Frank, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). The Baldwin Court
held a sentence of more than six months' imprisonment "sufficiently severe by itself"
to require jury trial. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69 n.6. The Frank Court held a probationary sentence of three years petty for jury-right purposes. See Frank, 395 U.S. at
151-52. Except for the fine, the penalties at issue in Blanton were no different in
substance from those in Baldwin or Frank. Furthermore, in Baldwin and Frank, the
Court grounded its reasoning on legislative evaluations of seriousness. See Baldwin,
399 U.S. at 70-72; Frank, 395 U.S. at 150-52, 156; see also supra Part III.A.
138.
In fact, the Nevada legislature does not define petty offenses. But see NEV.
REv. STAT. § 193.120 (1987) (defining a "misdemeanor" as "[e]very crime punishable
by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more
than 6 months" [emphasis added]). In Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 409 P.2d 245
(Nev. 1965), the Nevada Supreme Court held a Nevada "misdemeanor" to be equivalent to a "petty offense" for the purposes of the Nevada Constitution's provision guaranteeing jury trial. See id. at 248; see also NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3. The court pointed out that offenses triable without a jury at common law were triable without a
jury in Nevada. See Hudson, 409 P.2d at 246. Next, in State v. Smith, 672 P.2d 631
(Nev. 1983), the Nevada Supreme Court took "offenses triable without a jury at com-
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at the statute defining the offense. In the lower courts, Blanton
apparently pled the wrong statute. He asked them to decide the
constitutionality of a statute authorizing summary prosecutions
in municipal court, while Las Vegas and North Las Vegas are
incorporated cities and thus governed by different statutes. 3 9
The Nevada Supreme Court, apparently not briefed on the proper role of the legislature in evaluating offenses and penalties,
treated Blanton's mistake as dispositive of his constitutional
challenge to the municipal regulations. It decided Blanton's constitutional entitlement to jury trial without reference to any
statute other than the one defining the offense.'" Thus, the
Blanton opinion leaves open the question of the application of
legislative evaluations of penalties, including 18 U.S.C. § 19 or
any other statute defining petty offenses, to the courts' constitutional determinations of the jury right. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court noted that Blanton's fine fell well within
even
Congress' most recent definition of petty offenses,'
though the federal definition was not binding on Nevada.
Even more intriguing, the Court cited the wrong statute
when it called attention to Congress' definition. Noting the repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), 42' the Court seemed to cast about for
some indication of the highest fine Congress would impose in
conjunction with a maximum prison term of six months. It located that fine, $5,000, not in 18 U.S.C. § 19, but in §
3571(b)(6).'" This section failed to reveal to the Court that
some offenses authorize prison terms of only six months but still
carry a maximum fine over $5,000. For example, unlawfully
killing a threatened species is punishable by six months and/or a
fine of up to $25,000.1" Moreover, the Court turned to this sec-

mon law" to mean that offenses punishable by less than six months' imprisonment
did not entitle a defendant to jury trial, citing a criminal contempt case, Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974), as authority for its position; further, the Nevada
Court cited Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), as authority to ignore Congress'
definition of petty offenses, without citing Hudson to show that a Nevada misdemeanor is a petty offense. See Smith, 672 P.2d at 633-34. In neither Smith nor
Blanton did the Nevada Supreme Court consider the Nevada legislature's definition
of "misdemeanor" or "gross misdemeanor."
See Blanton v. North Las Vegas Municipal Court, 748 P.2d 494, 497 & n.5
139.
(Nev. 1987).
See, e.g., id. at 499 & n.7; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.379 (1987) (defin140.
ing the offense of driving under the influence).
See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545 n.11.
141.
142.
See id.
143.
See id.
144. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(G) and 1540(b)(1) (1994).
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tion only because it mistakenly thought "Congress no longer
14 5
defines offenses as 'petty."
C. Contemporary Affronts to 18 U.S.C. § 19
Subsequent decisions in at least three circuit courts have
read Blanton as if it required the court simply to examine the
authorized penalties through the lens of its own conscience to
determine whether the penalties "reflect" the legislature's determination that the offense is serious." s These courts have not
considered 18 U.S.C. § 19 as a component of defendants' constitutional entitlement to jury trial; they have considered only
whether Congress' definition of petty offenses amounts to a statutory entitlement. Consequently, the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits have denied jury trial even where the maximum authorized
fine for an individual is $10,000.14' The Ninth Circuit followed
suit with a $25,000 fine. 1' Each court considered 18 U.S.C. §
19 only as a statute irrelevant to the scope of the jury right under the Constitution, not as a statute indicating a legislative
determination that the offense is "serious. 77149
145. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545 n.11.
146. Among lower courts, research for this Comment turned up only two postBlanton published decisions which consider a defendant's constitutional right to jury
trial in the light of 18 U.S.C. § 19. One is a federal district court decision on a
violation of the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act, punishable by a $10,000 fine.
See United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1419 (D.Kan. 1995) (following pre-Blanton
Tenth Circuit precedent, United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1980)).
The other is "mere dicta of the worst sort," appearing in a bankruptcy court opinion
and indicating a United States Trustee's proposal to seek sanctions of only $5,000,
rather than $30,000, to avoid the necessity of .a jury trial. See In re Shirley, 184
B.R. 613 (N.D. Ga. 1995). This dicta par excellence is cited in the U.S.C.A.'s annotations explaining the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 19. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 19 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1997). Before Blanton, some federal courts did use Congress' definition to decide defendants' entitlements to jury trial. Some did not. See John F. Gillespie, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial for Offense Punishable by Fine Exceeding $500 as Affected
by a Definition of Petty Offenses in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1(3), 40 A.L.R. FED. 876 (1978 &
Supp. 1996).
147.
See United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing
Soderna), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2517 (1997); United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d
1370 (7th Cir.) (holding defendants had no constitutional right to jury trial and citing
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), as authority to pass over Congress' definition of petty offenses at 18 U.S.C. § 19), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996). But see
United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Kan. 1995) (granting jury trial because $10,000 maximum authorized fine exceeds Congress' definition of petty offenses). All of these cases involve 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) and (b) of the Free Access to
Clinic Entrances Act.
148. See United States v. Clavette, 135 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1998).
149.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit followed the United States Supreme Court in locating Congress' definition of petty offenses at 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), strongly suggesting
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A trio of Seventh Circuit cases, all decided by Judges Posner
and Flaum, carves out this position. First, in United States v.
Kozel, 150 a contempt case, the attorney-defendant argued that
the monetary value of his sentence - pro bono service in five
criminal cases within two years - exceeded the $5,000 limit for
petty offenses set out in 18 U.S.C. § 19. The Seventh Circuit
dismissed this argument by citing Muniz's phrase, "Congress'
definition has no talismanic significance," 5 ' and by finding
Kozel's sentence more akin to probation or work release than to
a fine.' 52 Next, in Hatch v. Stadtmueller,'53 the court found
the defendant's constitutional entitlement to a jury trial, where
she was subject to a maximum fine of $10,000, was not so obvious that automatically reversible error would result from continuing with bench trial below. Her petition for mandamus relief
TM a
was therefore denied. Finally, in United States v. Soderna,'
divided court applied the reasoning of Kozel to hold that a defendant charged with a first-time offense of blocking the entrance to
an abortion clinic - punishable by up to six months and $10,000
was not entitled to jury trial. 5 ' The Soderna majority noted
that it had been shown nothing in the text or history of the statute defining the offense that suggested the statute was intended
to confer the right to jury trial."5 The majority also compared
the six-month/$10,000 authorized penalty to the penalty in question in Blanton, six months and/or $1,000 plus various other
sanctions. 57 According to Judges Posner and Flaum:
that the courts - and the Court - look to past judicial decisions even to read statutes. See, for example, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994), which
apparently read Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), to find Congress' definition
of petty offenses at 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), rather than looking up the current definition at
18 U.S.C. § 19. The Ninth Circuit, speaking realistically, was forced to consider
whether the Supreme Court, not Congress, would think a $25,000 fine indicated a
serious offense; hence they might be excused for looking to Bagwell instead of
Congress' current definition. See Clavette, 135 F.3d at 1310 & n.14.
908 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1990).
150.
151. Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477, cited in Kozel, 908 F.2d at 207.
See Kozel, 908 F.2d at 207. In a later, related case, the Seventh Circuit
152.
panel, this time without Judge Posner, followed Kozel. See In re Betts, 927 F.2d 983
(7th Cir. 1991). In contrast to Kozel, Betts received three months' imprisonment,
most of it suspended, supervised release, and a $25 fine. See id. at 986.
41 F.3d 1510 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). The statute in
153.
question in Hatch was the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248
(1994).
154. 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hatch v. United States, 117
S. Ct. 507 (1996).
155. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1377-79.
See id. at 1377.
156.
See supra Part III.B.
157.
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If careful attention is paid to the word "clearly" in the ... passage that we quoted [i.e., penalties other than imprisonment
must be "so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a 'serious' one,"
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543], it is apparent that even though the
maximum fine is higher in the present case than it was in
Blanton it is not so much higher as to make clear that Congress considered a first-time blockade of an abortion clinic a
serious offense."
The court acknowledged that a fine of $10,000 is "higher" than a
fine of $1,000, but decided it is not all that much higher; besides,
the court added, 18 U.S.C. § 19 allows an organization to be
fined $10,000 without jury trial, and "many individuals have
more money than organizations."159 The court adduced no evidence that the individual on trial had more money than most
organizations. There was no evidence of how much money "most"
individuals or organizations have. There was not even any argument from the court that its best guess as to the relative
amounts of money possessed by many individuals and most organizations was constitutionally more significant than Congress'
definition of petty offenses."
Judges Posner and Flaum may be right, if courts must be
prohibited from reading 18 U.S.C. § 19 as Congress' indication
that offenses punishable by fines over $5,000 are serious. Maybe
a $10,000 fine is not "clearly" serious if a $1,000 fine is not. But
clarity is best served by using 18 U.S.C. § 19 as the legislature's
definition of which offenses are serious and which are not. In
fact, the dissenting judge analyzed the entire issue in almost
exactly the way this comment suggests. 6 ' Judge Kanne concluded:

158.
Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1378.
159. Id. at 1379.
160.
The Soderna court found it difficult to believe that "the difference in resources between individuals and organizations has constitutional significance."
Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1379. This difference certainly seemed to have constitutional
significance in the eyes of the Muniz Court. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454
(1975); see also supra Part IIIA.
161. Judge Kanne's dissent does not articulate the petty offense doctrine's historical call for legislative involvement; nor does it consider and reject other possible
interpretations of the statute. It simply states that the court must respect the
legislature's determination of seriousness and that it is safer to apply the statutory
definition of petty offenses than to scan one's conscience to decide whether the legislature considered the offense "serious." See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1387 (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
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[T]his holding misconstrues relevant Supreme Court precedent
and disregards objective evidence of Congress' express intent.... To consider such a crime petty and deny defendants
charged with it the right to trial by jury, as the majority does
today, is to contravene Supreme Court instruction by substituting a judicial
determination as to seriousness for that of Con162
gress.

Nor did Judge Kanne's dissent dissuade the Eleventh Circuit
from following the Soderna majority in United States v.
Unterburger.'" Judge Hatfield, the district judge who denied
Clavette a jury trial, stood on persuasive authority from two
circuit courts."6 And, if the Ninth Circuit looked for Supreme
Court authority to consider 18 U.S.C. § 19 in determining
Clavette's jury right, it certainly did not find any. Since the
Blanton decision, the Supreme Court has lost track of Congress'
definition of petty offenses. Not only is the definition not cited in
two post-Blanton cases discussing petty offenses," but the Supreme Court's most recent mention of the definition, the 1993
decision United Mine Workers v. Bagwell," incorrectly locates
it at 18 U.S.C. § 1(3).16 How much respect could the Court
have for Congress' definition?
IV. THE LEGISLATURE'S DETERMINATION OF SERIOUSNESS: CAN
A STATUTE BE MEANINGLESS?

Congress defines offenses not in terms of their seriousness
but in terms of their pettiness:
As used in this title, the term "petty offense" means a Class B
misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction, for
which the maximum fine is no greater than the amount set

162. Id. at 1380, 1387 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
163. See United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413 (11th Cir. 1996) (following
Soderna without mentioning Judge Kanne's dissent and denying jury trial to defendants subject to a maximum fine of $10,000).
164. See United States v. Clavette, No. MCR-96-001-BU, Order of Apr. 4, 1996,
at 1, and Order of June 5, 1996, at 1.
165. See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993) (per curiam) (denying jury
trial to defendant subject to prison terms of up to six months and up to five years'
residence in a community correctional facility); Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322
(1996) (denying jury trial to defendant charged with two petty offenses, each punishable by up to six months' imprisonment).
166. 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
167. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837 n.5. The Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme
Court's citation to § 1(3) in Clavette. See Clavette, 135 F.3d 1308, 1310 & n.14 (9th
Cir. 1998).
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forth for such an offense in section 3571(b)(6) or (7) in the case
of an individual [$5,000] or section 3571(c)(6) or (7) in the case
of an organization [$10,000].1

The meaning of the words is not mysterious, but their application is not clear. The statute certainly says nothing about jury
trial, but why does Congress define petty offenses? 169 Does Congress contemplate "serious" as the opposite of "petty"?170 Is its
choice of the word "petty" a coincidence? One can move in two
directions to answer this question: horizontally, into the statute's
contemporary context, and vertically, into the statute's histo17 1

ry.

A. The Statute's Contemporary Context: Pefty Offenses in the
United States Code
The contemporary context of the statute includes its current
and entire version, analogous provisions and their current judicial interpretations, and at least some of the canons of statutory
construction. 72 Only if that analysis yields no unambiguous
meaning will the new textualist turn to legislative history. In
this case, a strictly horizontal analysis must be further confined

168. 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1994).
169. It is not clear whether this is a permissible question for a new textualist to
ask. One parodic example of 'plain language' interpretation demonstrates that it
might be a good idea to ask why a legislature enacts a particular statute, since no
legislature can make the precise applications of its intent perfectly clear. See Regina
v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. (Ontario) 137 (1965-66) (holding that a pony saddled with a
down pillow is a "small bird" for purposes of Canada's Small Birds Act), quoted in
United States v. Byrnes, 644 F.2d 107, 112 n.9 (2d Cir. 1981).
170. A strict new textualist would presume, "by a benign fiction," Congress'
awareness of "the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated." See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 22, at 679. Not only is this benign
fiction potentially false in any case, but, in the case of 18 U.S.C. § 19, the presumption begs the fundamental question: into which body of law is the statute to be integrated?
171. These terms are taken from William N. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 116, 120, 122-25 (1988); see also Eskridge, New
Textualism, supra note 22, at 678-69. A vertical analysis explores committee reports,
hearings, floor debates, and so forth. A horizontal analysis examines the entire contemporary statutory context, including related statutes, the canons of construction,
and judicial precedents construing the statute in question and/or its related statutes.
See id. at 674-75. New textualists are primarily concerned with horizontal analysis,
deploying vertical analysis only when a statute remains meaningless or ambiguous
after thorough horizontal scrutiny. See id.
172. Professor Eskridge points out that some new textualists, particularly Justice
Scalia, appear to "like" some canons more than others and have yet to explain their
preferences. See id. at 674-76.
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to title 18, because the definition pertains only to "this title."173
Since the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines - which
exclude from their scope any Class B or C misdemeanor and any
infraction, regardless of the maximum authorized fine or prison
term"74 only three sections' 5 of title 18176 use Congress'
definition
of petty offenses without expanding or restricting
177
it.

These three sections, however, deal only with sentencing for
offenses not covered by the Guidelines; section 19, by contrast,
must have a more general application, because it appears among
the general provisions of chapter 1. Section 19 must stand on the
173.
18 U.S.C. § 19 (1994). Foregoing consideration of other titles is no loss;
petty offenses are no longer referred to outside of title 18. The Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, effected a far-reaching repeal of references to petty offenses throughout the United States Code. Absent some bearing on
the jury right, therefore, Congress' definition of petty offenses would be of historical
interest only. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982) (aliens who have committed petty
offenses cannot be excluded from the country); 16 U.S.C. §§ 460k-3, 460n-8 (1982)
(defining and providing for trial of petty offenses in national conservation areas); 28
U.S.C. § 591 (1982) (independent counsel cannot indict public official for petty offense); and 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982) (U.S. magistrates have jurisdiction to try misdemeanors and other petty offenses); see also Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 208, 220(a), 221,
222(b), and 228(b), 98 Stat. 1986, 2028, 2030.
174. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.9 (West 1998).
175. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b), 3561(aX3), 3583(b)(3) (1994).
176. Strictly speaking, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and certainly the Rules
of Evidence, fall outside title 18, but they refer to "petty offenses" and/or Congress'
definition at 18 U.S.C. § 19. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101(e) (1994) (Federal Rules of
Evidence apply to trial of misdemeanors and other petty offenses in magistrate
courts unless the rules governing trials by magistrates make other provisions for the
introduction of evidence); FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(bX4) and (c) (1994) (misdemeanors and
other petty offenses, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 19, are governed by Rule 58); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 58(aX3) (1994) (defining "petty offenses for which . . . no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed" in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 19); FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(aXl)-(3)
(1994) (Rule 58 governs misdemeanors and other petty offenses if sentence of imprisonment is possible); and FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(bX2XF) (1994) (magistrate judge must
inform defendant of right to jury trial unless offense is petty). Read in conjunction
with FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(bX4), this last provision seems clearly to indicate that an
offense falling outside Congress' definition must be tried by jury.
177.
Several provisions in title 18 refer to the definition at § 19 in order to
expand or restrict the variety of offenses falling within the definition. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. §§ 3156(b)(2), 3172(2) (1994) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 223(h), (j)
(1984)) (defining "offense" as used in pertinent sections as any offense except a Class
B or C misdemeanor or an infraction); 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1994) (defendant in magistrate court may elect trial by district court unless charged with a petty offense
which is a Class B motor vehicle misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction). Moreover, most appearances of the phrase "petty offense" are applicable only to
offenses committed before November 1, 1987, the date on which the Sentencing
Guidelines went into effect. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(aX1XA), (2)(A) (1982) (providing for representation by counsel of any person charged with a felony or misdemeanor other than a petty offense).
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same footing as the provisions surrounding it. If the definition
pertained only to sentencing, it 'plainly' would have been
codified
17
in chapter 207, with the other sentencing provisions. 1
Horizontal analysis, then, does not plumb the full meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 19. Clearly, Congress considers Class B or C misdemeanors punishable by a fine higher than $5,000 to be equivalent to Class A misdemeanors for sentencing purposes. Yet, because Congress codified its definition in chapter 1, sentencing
cannot be the only application envisioned for the section. A quick
glance at Congress' recodification of its definition of petty offenses in 1987 dispels any remaining doubt; Congress chose to
keep its definition in chapter 1, among provisions of general
import, while reconstructing sentencing provisions later in the
Code. 79 Unfortunately, no application more general than sentencing appears on the face of the statute. Its meaning, then,
must be sought elsewhere.
B. The Statute's History: CongressionalIntent to Indicate Its
Determination of Seriousness
Failing horizontal coherence, the only remaining option is to
delve into the vertical plane of legislative history. Setting aside
(arguendo) the earliest history of the statute as "stale,""8 committee reports from 1984, 1987, and 1988 all demonstrate
Congress' awareness that the word "serious" is the constitutional

178.
Still, the scope of the three sections dealing with magistrates' sentencing
powers is telling: in each instance, an offense which falls outside Congress' definition
must be handled by the sentencing court in exactly the same manner as a Class A
misdemeanor or a felony. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) requires courts, in sentencing defendants convicted of offenses falling outside the Guidelines, to consider the
same principles that drive the Guidelines, unless the defendant is convicted of a
petty offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(aX3) allows the sentencing court to impose probation
only if every offense for which the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment is a petty
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(bX3) allows supervised release for up to one year if the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor other than a petty offense. In each of these
provisions, a Class A misdemeanor and an offense punishable by a fine which exceeds $5,000 for an individual are treated identically.
179.
See Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987); see also H.R. REP. No. 100390, at 4-5 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2140-41.
180.
Congress first enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) in 1930, setting the limit on fines
imposed for a petty offense at $500. See Pub. L. 71-548, 46 Stat. 1029, 1030 (1930).
Fifty-four years later, Congress finally revised that amount to $5,000 to account for
the rather dramatic change in the value of money: "If a $500 fine for an individual
was 'petty' in 1930, when the per capita disposable income was $599 [citation
omitted], then $5,000 is 'petty' today, when the per capita disposable income is
$9,969 [citation omitted]." H.R. REP. No. 98-906, at 19, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5433, 5451.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/7

36

Hartigan: Creatures of the Common
Law:
The Petty Offense
Doctrine and 18 U.S.C. § 19
PETTY
OFFENSE
DOCTRINE
379

1998]

opposite of the word "petty" and Congress' intent that courts
should consider its definition in determining a defendant's jury
right. Congress even took some suggestions for its definition
from judicial decisions on the jury right, particularly Muniz v.
Hoffman,1 ' the decision which has been so influential in getting the statute ignored. In the Criminal Fines Enforcement Act
of 1984,182 Congress cited Muniz as authority for increasing its
$500 fine limit for petty offenses, in place since 1930; the Court,
Congress said, found "no talismanic significance in the
amount." 1" Moreover, Congress for the first time distinguished
between fine levels for petty offenses committed by individuals
and those committed by organizations. And, as the upper limit
for organizations' petty offenses, Congress chose $10,000, the fine
levied against the union in Muniz.
Congress also considered a markedly higher ceiling: $80,000.
Immediately following its citation of Muniz, the House Report
mentioned United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc., 1 where
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found an $80,000 fine petty
for purposes of the jury right. This too was a criminal contempt
case, and $80,000 was Troxler's potential profit from shipping
highly flammable sleepwear, previously seized by the court, out
of the court's jurisdiction to Venezuela for sale to consumers
there. The House Report does not comment on the fine itself.
Yet, less than two years later, Congress enacted its new definition of petty offenses. The citation of Troxler Hosiery in the report implies that Congress limited organizations' fines for petty
offenses to $10,000, knowing it was giving broader scope to the
jury right than some courts had been willing to do.
That Congress fully intended to take a position on the scope
of the jury right is demonstrated by its reference to the constitutional significance of the line between serious and petty offenses:
There is, as a matter of constitutional law, no right to a jury

181.
422 U.S. 454 (1975), cited in H.R. REP. No. 98-906, at 19, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5433, 5452.
182.
Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984).
183. The text of the House Report said the Court found no such significance in
the amount. See H.R. REP. No. 98-906, at 19, reprinted in U.S.C.C.AN. 5433, 5452.
The Court actually said it found no such significance in the definition. See Muniz,
422 U.S. at 477.
184. See United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 934, 937-38 (4th
Cir. 1982), cited in H.R. REP. No. 98-906, at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5433, 5452; see also United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc., 672 F.2d 365 (4th
Cir. 1982) (prohibiting Troxler from moving the sleepwear out of the Middle District
of North Carolina).
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trial for a petty offense. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147 (1969). The courts have based their determination of
whether an offense is petty on the severity of the maximum
punishment authorized, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159
(1968), or if the statute defining the offense does not specify the
punishment - e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (criminal contempt of
court) - on the actual punishment imposed, Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968). Since the Constitution does not explicitly define what is petty, the courts have had to look elsewhere to determine whether a punishment, authorized or imposed, is petty or serious. In "the interests of uniformity, objectivity, and practical judicial administration," the courts have
therefore looked to 18 U.S.C. § 1 "as the monetary measure of a
serious offense for the purposes of the right to jury trial." United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977)."
Congress recognized, then, the constitutional significance of
the petty offense doctrine. It sought to limit the free play of judicial discretion where the jury right was concerned, it took responsibility for updating the demarcating line, and it clearly
explained what it was doing.
The history of Congress' attention to the definition, in addition to its explanations of its actions in various reports, confirm
that it took its own definitional task seriously. To begin with,
Congress updated the fine in the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act
of 1984,"6 but the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 repealed 18
U.S.C. § 1 as of November 1, 1987. To keep the definition in
effect, Congress passed the Criminal Fine Improvements Act of
1987, creating a new section under Chapter 1 of title 18, § 19,
and transferring the definition to that location.18 7 But even
that did not take care of the problem, because the 1987 Act defined petty offenses as Class B or Class C misdemeanors or infractions. These classes of offenses were defined in 18 U.S.C. §
3559(a) in terms of the maximum authorized term of imprisonment. Thus, the 1987 Act neglected to provide a specific monetary definition of petty offenses as the 1984 Act had done. This
neglect was troublesome enough to provoke yet another amendment in 1988. Once again, Congress related the amendment's

185. H.R. REP. No. 98-906, at 19 (1984) (footnote omitted), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5433, 5452; see also Pub. L. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984).
186.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-906, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5433, 5451; see also Pub. L. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984).
187.
See H.R. REP. No. 100-390, at 4-5 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2140-41; see also Pub. L. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987).
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purpose to the petty offense doctrine, and once again it chose a
$5,000 ceiling for individuals and $10,000 for organizations."'
Unfortunately, the syntax of the House and Senate reports
on the 1988 amendment is confused and contorted where it
should be clearest. For instance, the fourth sentence in this passage from the House of Representatives' report on the bill is
confusing:
The significance of the label "petty offense" is that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply if a person is charged
with a petty offense. The term "petty offense" is presently defined by 18 U.S.C. 19 to be a "class B misdemeanor, a class C
misdemeanor, or an infraction." The terms "class B misdemeanor," "class C misdemeanor," and "infraction" are in turn defined
at 18 U.S.C. 3559(a) by the maximum term of imprisonment
that can be imposed. Thus, it is possible for an offense carrying
a maximum term of imprisonment of 5 days, an infraction under 18 U.S.C. 3559(a)(1)(I), to have a fine so substantial that
the offense would not be a "petty offense" for the purpose of the
exception to the right of a jury trial." 9
Read in context, surely that fourth sentence means to say it is
possible for even an infraction to entail a substantial fine and
still be petty in the sense of falling outside the scope of the right
to jury trial. This interpretation is supported by the report's very
next paragraph:
Section 7089(a) [of the bill] modifies the definition of "petty
offense" in 18 U.S.C. 19 by providing that a petty offense cannot call for a fine in excess of $5,000 for an individual and
$10,000 for an organization, the maximum fine levels set forth
in 18 U.S.C. 3571(b)(6) and (7). 19
The amendment remedies the situation by triggering the right to
jury trial at $5,000 for an individual or $10,000 for an organization. One might seek corroboration from the Senate report on the
same bill, but the second sentence of this passage is daunting:
For many cases the maximums set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3571(b)(6)
or (7) and (c)(6) or (7) - $5,000 for an individual and $10,000
for an organization - would operate to set a constitutionally
permissible limit for petty offenses. However, the 1987 definition of petty offense inadvertently included a class of offenses

188.
189.
190.

See 134 CONG. REC. 13,787 (1988); 134 CONG. REC. 33,301 (1988).
134 CONG. REc. 33,301 (1988).

Id.
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which may be petty for constitutional purposes even though
they are Class B or C misdemeanors or infractions as classified
by 18 U.S.C. 3559: offenses punishable by six months' or less
imprisonment which, by the terms of the statutes setting forth
such offenses, carry a higher maximum fine than the $5,000 or
$10,000 levels provided for in [section 3571]. The higher
amount would be the lawful maximum for these offenses....
The amendments made by this section [of the bill] cure
this problem by redefining the term petty offense to include
only Class B and C misdemeanors and infractions for which the
applicable amount is no greater than the specific dollar levels
set forth for such offenses in 18 U.S.C. 3571(b) (6) or (7) and
(c)(6) or (7).9l

Here, the second sentence is barely intelligible. Again, however, read in context, the amendment is intended to trigger the
jury right at $5,000 for individuals and $10,000 for organizations, even if the charge is only a Class B or C misdemeanor or
an infraction.
Under this reading, the first sentence's phrase "[flor many
cases" refers to the multitude of Class B and C misdemeanors
entailing fines of $5,000 or lower. Offenses below Class A misdemeanors entail maximum prison time of six months or less.1"
But some Class B or C misdemeanors - illegally taking a
threatened species, for example - entail fines as high as
$25,000.193 In the 1987 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 19, these
offenses were inadvertently included in Congress' definition of
petty offenses, because in 1987 Congress defined petty offenses
as all Class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. The 1988
amendment attempts to ascertain that only those Class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions entailing a maximum fine of $5,000
are considered petty offenses.
C. Congress'Definition of Petty Offenses Clearly Applies to the
Jury Right: Why Do Courts Refuse to Use It?
Despite their overall awkwardness, there is only one coherent interpretation of these reports. There simply is no reason to
enact 18 U.S.C. § 19 in the first place, much less to amend it

191.
134 CONG. REc. 13,787.
192.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1988).
193.
See id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(bXl) (1994) and Pub. L. No. 100-478, §
1007(b), 102 Stat. 2306, 2309 (1988) (increasing maximum authorized fine for offense
of killing a threatened species from $10,000 to $25,000).
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twice in the next four years, unless Congress intended that an
offense punishable by a fine over $5,000 (or $10,000 if committed
by an organization) should entitle a defendant to trial by jury.
Why, then, have the courts so often failed to give Congress'
definition the respect usually given valid exercises of legislative
powers? One plausible reason is the fifty-four year lapse in
Congress' definition. Before Congress raised the ceiling, more
than one court correctly called attention to the absurdity of
drawing mid-1970's lines in 1930 dollars."9 Congress has done
nothing since 1988 to address the nature of this problem, though
it would be a simple matter to index the fine for inflation and
thus protect against such absurdity in the future. Another plausible reason is that the parties involved in the pivotal cases have
not phrased the issue so as to suit the Court's tests.
A more intriguing possibility is that the courts simply do not
believe that Congress' definition of petty offenses is a constitutionally effective exercise of its legislative powers. The petty
offense doctrine, after all, is a judicially created one. Moreover, it
addresses a question of constitutional interpretation, and direct
legislative answers to such questions appear out of place. Given
the historical development of the petty offense doctrine, however,
the courts should readily consider a legislative definition of petty
offenses to be directly applicable to their determination of the
jury right under the Constitution.
V.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS

Adopting the approach of this Comment requires no leap of
faith or departure from precedent. To begin with, the courts can
simply begin to honor the common law authority of the legislature to define which offenses are serious and which petty. In the
case of federal offenses, Congress' definition of petty offenses, not
merely judges' perceptions of the gravity of the penalty in the
statute defining the offense, should be taken as the decisive
factor in determining whether a particular defendant is entitled
to a jury trial. As a second step, the courts should fulfill their
obligation to measure Congress' determination against the common-law requirements and against the "existing laws and practices in the Nation"'95 to ensure that Congress' definition does
not deny the jury right where the Constitution demands it.

194. See, e.g., Hoffman v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 492 F.2d 929, 937 n.9 (9th Cir. 1974).
195. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
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If the administrability of an increase in the number of jury
trials should become a concern, courts might follow a rule like
that announced in Scott v. Illinois.1 In Scott, the Supreme
Court held that no indigent defendant may be sentenced to any
prison term unless counsel is appointed. Under the Scott rule, a
judge may choose, at arraignment, not to appoint counsel for an
indigent defendant; if the judge makes that choice, however, she
cannot impose any prison term if the defendant is found guilty.
The judge's choice not to appoint counsel therefore trims her
jurisdiction over the defendant. Similarly, a judge's choice to
deny jury trial might trim her jurisdiction where maximum penalties are concerned. Even though the statute defining a particular offense authorizes six months' imprisonment and a fine of
$25,000, for example, denial of jury trial would curtail the maximum penalty to six months and/or $5,000.
Legislatures, on the other hand, can avoid the inconvenience
of amending the fine level appropriate for petty offenses simply
by indexing maximum fines for inflation. Congress could easily
avoid the farce of leaving a dollar-level fine unchanged for fiftyfour years. Additionally, if Congress' objective is to trigger the
jury right at six months and/or $5,000, as it said in 1984, 1987,
and 1988, it must act to preserve the integrity of its definition of
petty offenses. Congress might consider amendments requiring,
for example, that only a certain term of probation may be imposed for petty offenses,197 or that the penalties attached to
multiple charges must be aggregated to determine a defendant's
right to jury trial."9 Under the analysis presented here, such
amendments would not constitute legislative usurpation of judicial authority, because the petty offense doctrine explicitly calls
for the legislature's evaluation of the seriousness of the penalties
it authorizes. If the Court's role is confined to policing the minimum constitutional protection of the jury right, Congress may
expand the scope of the right as it wishes.

196.
440 U.S. 367 (1979). See, e.g., United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512
(10th Cir. 1991) (denying jury trial but agreeing to impose sentence no greater than
six months). Apparently, some circuits have not decided whether the Scott rule applies to federal misdemeanors. Compare, e.g., United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648
(10th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Downin, 884 F. Supp. 1474 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
with United States v. Ramirez, 555 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
197.
This would obviate the Supreme Court's rulings in United States v.
Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993) and Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
198. This would obviate the Supreme Court's ruling in Lewis v. United States,
518 U.S. 322 (1996).
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Historical jurisprudence on the petty offense doctrine consistently seeks out the legislature's evaluation of the seriousness of
any given offense. Article III and the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution confer the jury right only for the trial of serious
crimes, but it is up to the legislature to say which crimes are
serious and which are petty. While the Supreme Court has never
repudiated the legislature's role, its opinions have given rise to
the assumption that only the statute defining the offense is relevant. Consequently, courts scrutinize the penalty in that statute
to discern its "reflection" of the legislature's determination of
seriousness, and reflection becomes speculation. Congress has
taken great pains to update, re-enact, and amend its definition of
petty offenses to inform the judiciary that it considers serious
those offenses for which it authorizes penalties in excess of its
definition. 18 U.S.C. § 19 provides an objective definition that
can simplify the courts' work, and it is historically entitled to the
courts' respect.
Extrapolating from the analysis in this Comment, in a given
case, federal or state, a court should determine the defendant's
entitlement to jury trial under the United States Constitution in
two steps. First, the court should consult both the statute defining the offense and any catch-all statutes, such as a definition of
petty or serious offenses, to glean the legislature's evaluation of
the seriousness of the offense. If the legislature considers the
offense serious, the court's analysis is complete, and it must
grant the defendant a jury trial. But if the legislature considers
the offense petty, or if the legislature's evaluation remains unclear, the court must go on to consider whether previous judicial
decisions or the clear majority of other legislatures have declared
the offense serious in light of its attached penalties. For instance, any offense punishable by more than six months' imprisonment is serious, even if the legislature calls the offense petty
and seeks to deny jury trials.1 Similarly, a legislature might
authorize a fine of $25,000 and define petty offenses as those
entailing fines of less than $50,000; however, the offense is still
serious and still requires jury trial if the clear majority of other
legislatures grant jury trial for offenses punishable by more than

$5,000.
Clavette's case presents a relatively straightforward applica-

199.

See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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tion of this analysis. The maximum authorized fine for the offense of killing a grizzly bear is $25,000, well over the $5,000
limit prescribed in Congress' definition of petty offenses. He is
therefore entitled to a jury trial under the federal Constitution.
Clavette's story about how he came to shoot the bear may be
patently absurd.2 '" But where Congress has authorized such a
high fine, the absurdity of the story is clearly for a jury to decide.

200.
Clavette's own wife told a federal wildlife agent that the whole incident
began when her husband fired a warning shot at a bear which appeared across a
small creek from their camp. The bear retreated about ten feet but then stopped.
Clavette tried to throw to the bear the heart and lungs of the moose he was skinning, but he dropped them. See Tr. at 209-10; see also supra note 1. At that point,
she said, the bear began to move off down the creek; her husband advanced on the
bear and shot it. See Tr. at 209-10. Needless to say, this is not exactly the same
story Mrs. Clavette told the judge; she told the judge there were two bears, that the
second bear charged her husband at a dead run, see id. at 121, and that her husband stopped it cold with a single bullet at 50 feet, see id. at 122, 128, 152. The
forensic evidence in the case was also compelling. See, e.g., id. at 10, 36, 43-44, and
212-13.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/7

44

